A Sad End to 2024

 The Jeju Crash

When Pilots Panic

From a pilot's perspective there is not a damn thing we can do if our plane is shot out of the sky. However, when there is a bird strike, that's a different story. This is when our training takes over. While a bird strike could be catastrophic at the wrong time, pilots should have the emotional stability and requisite training to fly the plane. In my opinion, these pilots panicked. 

I have not seen footage of their first arrival. Were they configured for landing? I would assume so, therefore, on their miss-approach they brought up their gear and flaps for the go-around. Meaning they had hydraulics to do so. A flock of birds could have impacted their hydraulics, yes. But if so, that did not force them to fly at full speed without flaps and belly the aircraft into a landing, ultimately hitting a wall at full speed. 

On a missed approach, if they lost an engine and needed the performance, they would have brought the gear up and some flaps. They did not have to bring up all the flaps and put the plane into a clean configuration. Furthermore, if hydraulics were a concern the prudent thing would have been to leave some of the flaps out in anticipation of alternate flap extension. 

What should have happened if the plane was impacted by birds, a calm declaration to the tower such as, "Tower, Jeju 7C2216 had a bird strike. We lost our engine. We have a hydraulic issue. We would like to hold close to the runway to run our checklists." 

The Boeing 737 has engine driven hydraulic pumps, but also electric hydraulic pumps. The Boeing 737 even has an alternate gear extension system. Any pilot in this situation should hold, meaning they fly circles in the sky, and see what systems they have available, run checklists, and determine if there is enough runway length to land at their given weight. At the very least make their plane as light as possible before they attempted to land on a marginally sufficient runway, if that was their only option. These pilots took none of these actions 

The pilots repeatedly called "May Day" and landed, with multiple warnings screaming in their flight deck because of the the lack of flaps and gear at a low altitude. They ignored the warnings and pressed on, without knowledge or understanding that their actions would result in death.  Clean, short runway, they were fast. 

A fight or flight response is not often mentioned with piloting, but this is a perfect example that pilots need to keep flying the plane. To fight, would mean to do what is necessary to attack the problem. The flight response is to run. In this case these pilots felt running toward the safety of the ground was their best option. Were they aware of the redundant aircraft systems? Did they train for bird strikes? Did they lack understanding and therefore lacked confidence? Did they understand the inability to stop on the runway? Did they realize what they were about to do, would result in death? I suspect not. And becasue of that lack of understanding 179 people died. 

I believe with the new generation of pilots worldwide, without experience, and substandard training, that we might see similar situations in the future. Many think this is a foreign issue, not to be found in the US, but they would be wrong. As our highly experienced pilots are forced to retire at the age of 65, and are replaced with the new generation of pilots without experience, plugged into a training foot print to push them out as quickly as possible, I fear we will be seeing more accidents. 

There have been far too many accidents and incidents in 2024. By the grace of God have not manifested into such a catastrophe as this. Our industry is not getting safer, but going the wrong direction. Two solutions that could help mitigate the risk are as follows: 

1. Retain experienced pilots. Extend the pilot retirement age to 67. 
2. Improve pilot training to ensure the highest level of understanding and ability. 

What do you think the solutions should be?

DO NOT RUSH! 

Happy New Year

And health and Happiness to you and your family!

There are families who will not have a happy new year as a result of this needless crash. What will it take for airlines and regulatory agencies alike to do the right thing and prevent such loss? I'm not sure. I've seen the worst of training and violations with no accountability, so I wonder what will it take? 

May all your flights be safe in 2025

PS: I do not blame the pilots. They are a product of their environment. The company is responsible for putting them in the air ill prepared. 

Karlene K Petitt 

PhD. MBA. MHS.
A350, B777, A330, B747-400, B747-200, B767, B757, B737, B727

SWA Chief Pilot Threatened with Prison Time...

Details Alleged In the Naked and Masturbating SWA Captain Haak Case

 

Public filings recently emerged in the Christine Janning v. SWA and SWAPA case alleging Southwest System Chief Pilot, David Newton, attempted to obstruct the FBI’s Federal investigation. Apparently, in the hours just after learning that Janning had reported Captain Haak’s crimes to the FBI, David Newton wrote an email to multiple employees revealing Janning’s participation in the FBI investigation, sharing both her name and home address.

As if revealing the identity of a federally protected victim/witness in an ongoing federal investigation wasn’t bad enough, Newton advised that Janning’s removal was pursuant to a section of the contract (CBA 2.C.) which is ONLY reserved for pilots that have committed a crime, been detained by authorities for suspected illicit behavior, or if the pilot has demonstrated tendencies that draw into question their mental fitness for duty. None of which applied to Janning.

In short, a section 2.C. Is a “death sentence.” And according to Janning's recent filing, Newton's 2.C.citation “was done with purpose and malice for the express purpose of advising the recipients, that Ms. Janning was removed for the commission of a crime, and/or for psychological and fitness for duty.” (¶112)

The Significance of “2.C” 

Airlines have sections in their contracts, or policies, identifying actions for pilot violations, criminal behavior, or mental fitness for duty. At Southwest they call it a 2.C. at Delta they have a Section 15, the very language Delta used to weaponize my psychological evaluation in effort to destroy my career and professional reputation. This language is a death sentence and Airlines use it to weaponize the psychological evaluation process to silence pilots like Christine, myself and others. 

The FBI Was Not Amused

Christine was a federally protected victim/witness, and neither the FBI or the DOJ found Newton’s tactics of revealing their investigation to internal employees or sharing Janning by name with home address amusing, and thus turned their investigations into the retaliatory actions by Janning’s managers, specifically David Newton:

¶ 129 - “[Janning] advised FBI investigators of the significance of 2.C.language, and that her removal from all flying duties was actually a veiled threat to force Ms. Janning into a retaliatory psychological evaluation for reporting her incident to federal authorities.”

¶ 131 - “The DOJ immediately intervened and prohibited their federally protected witness from being threatened further.”

¶ 132 - “As a result of SWA’s retaliatory actions against Ms. Janning, primarily those of Cpt. Newton, the DOJ Prosecutor warned SWA, that Cpt. Newton’s, December 9, 2020 correspondence [2.C. email] jeopardized, their Federal case, and the victim’s privacy, by revealing their primary witness by name and home address, and exposed her to scrutiny by revealing her participation in a federal investigation.”

¶133 - The DOJ instructed Southwest to retain outside counsel because Newton’s email displayed a reckless disregard of the truth, and he exercise no ordinary care in the distribution of the misinformation, but he also violated Federal laws and DOJ and FBI policy when he disseminated his emails to a multitude of SWA and SWAPA employees of their investigation.”

¶ 134 - “The FBI and DOJ, warned Cpt. Newton, and SWA Legal, of possible, ‘prison time’ for their disclosure and interference and insinuated that charges may be a possibility.”

Janning has revealed these new details of retaliation and defamation in her amended complaint, in a case that she filed over two-years ago, because a Ninth Judicial Circuit of Orange County Florida Civil Judge, Judge Eric Netcher, has threatened to release Southwest System Chief Pilot David Newton from her lawsuit, asserting that the 2.C. language isn’t defamatory and therefore Janning couldn’t be harmed. What?!

Rumors of a mental health issue and/or criminal behavior of a pilot is damning enough. Yet as we all know the talk on the flight line will grow exponentially with such false rumors.  This fact, is one of the reasons that Judge Morris awarded such a significant amount in my case, ten times higher than typical, because of the "pilot talk." He knows the power of gossip and how damning what Delta asserted can be. We all do. 

Southwest and SWAPA argue that 2.C. language is nothing more than an administrative formality and serves only as notification to Janning advising of her removal. Janning is making every effort to enlighten the Judge so he understands the reality of what false assertions can do to a pilot. Thus, he is giving her another bite at this, and the reason for this new filing. 

I've been following this case, and after reading this current filing, and if Judge Netcher were to follow through with granting Southwest Motion to Dismiss David Newton, Janning has a strong argument for appeal. Prayers he allows justice to prevail. 

You may recall in Janning’s lawsuit, Captain Haak, the perpetrator, plead guilty in 2021 to a lewd obscene act under DC Federal Code, that included exposing the anus and genitals and masturbating, all while he was piloting a Boeing 737 at 41,000 feet with passengers and crew on board, while in the presence of his female First Officer, Christine Janning.

Since being sexually assaulted in the air, Christine Janning has been on a mission to legally hold Southwest Airlines, their managers, and her pilot union Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Association, SWPA, accountable, for covering up Captain Michael Haak’s previous sexual proclivities and acts of sexual harassment multiple female and male victims. Despite her employer’s attempts to throw multiple motions to dismiss her case, Janning is not giving up her fight. 

What do you think?

Time has a way of revealing all things, and the SWA and SWAPA delays have proven to be an asset. Christine has been contacted by multiple assault victims of Southwest perpetrators, not just Michael Haak, and she has helped them in their own battles. 

If you are an employee of Southwest Airlines and a victim of sexual harassment or assault, I highly encourage you to reach out to Christine. She can help. You can reach her through stopairlineassault@proton.me. 

Keep fighting Christine!

Calling Fatigued Airborne?

You Can't do that! 

Last week the world listened to the recording of the Delta Captain of Fight 564 who departed on a redeye flight, lost the autopilot, autothrust, and received a TAT probe message. They wanted to return, and the argument began as to the reason why he was returning, and what was legal to say or not.

Delta Flight 564 Return

The captain said he was departing Flight Level 1500, but that could have been due to the high stress, or maybe he didn’t know when flight levels began. Airlines do not typically train this type of information any more. This is one of those new hire captains with two years on the plane, I was told two years at the company, with less than 500 hours in type. Not the point, but he now has a broken airplane, and he’s making a good decision to return.

Dispatch has them reset the circuit breakers and they get their auto pilot back, but the TAT remains inoperative, therefore they have a variety of issues as a result thereof, one being the autothrust. The TAT is the Total Air Temperature Sensor, a heated probe that is an essential for input to the air data computer for static air temperature and true airspeed and they must avoid icing condition. The autothrust is gone.

As they fly circles, after dealing with the issue of resetting circuit breakers, the captain asks dispatch, “Is there something we’re waiting for?” And the dispatcher responds by telling them about the icing conditions on the route, but says there would not be any on arrival. They must avoid icing due to the probe failure. They will also have only have 10 minutes of holding over Albany, I suspect the alternate.

Then the captain tells dispatch, “We are right at our peak circadian low and I spoke with the first officer, and we don’t believe it’s within safety to continue flying throughout the night, at this time with no autothrottles.” He does not say he is fatigued. The circadian low statement was his asserting the time of night with his body clock. He never said, “We’re fatigued.”

Dispatch says, “Okay if you want to return because of fatigue, I can call the duty pilot to get him on the line.” The dispatcher apparently did not understand what the captain said, and was told that the duty pilot must give permission to call in fatigued. He wasn’t actually calling in fatigued.

PROBLEM BEGINS

They can’t get the duty pilot on the line, so they decide to land anyway. Then the duty pilot jumps on and the conversation degrades, opening preponderance of discussion amongst those who have listened to the audio.

You need to listen to this video yourself. But basically these are the questionable statements:

Duty pilot says, “Okay, this is new to me. You’re calling in fatigued airborne?”

“I’m confused with this fatigue versus a mechanical issue.”

The captain tries to explain.

Duty pilot says, “Okay umm… being that you’re airborne I would highly suggest that you not say that you’re fatigued for operation and more for mechanical situation I’m not sure how we can report you’re operating in a fatigued condition.”

He was not reporting in a fatigued condition. However, if he had been fatigued… why can’t a pilot report that in flight? I would hope that my pilots, if fatigued in flight, would want to land instead of falling asleep on final five hours later.

Additional Factors

Time of Day and Delay:

The crew was delayed out of San Francisco. This was a redeye flight. If you fly at night, your pilots will experience more fatigue than in the day. They are flying opposite to their body clock and there is no way they will be rested as if they had a good night sleep and awoke in the morning to fly. This flight had only have two pilots versus the four pilot international flights where pilots can sleep half the time.

Mechanical issue:

No auto thrust, no TAT and associated failed equipment, and a potential for the autopilot circuit breakers to blow again. Personally I would not take the flight.

History:

Delta had a 757-redeye flight out of Seattle, diverted for a medical. Then continued to Atlanta and both pilots fell asleep on arrival. The first officer awoke because the gear warning screamed as the plane flew toward the ground with gear up. They should have called fatigued on the divert.

A Delta Captain departed a daytime, three-hour, flight into Atlanta, in a 737, without an autopilot and autothrust. After three hours of flight, he then declared an emergency. Delta made a training video encouraging pilots to declare an emergency if they lose automation, because they have data that shows Delta pilots as a whole cannot fly without the automation. When questioned about this event retired FAA administrator, Steve Dickson the SVP of flight operations at the time, asserted, “It gives the impression that we are going to place operational requirements above safety requirements. It probably would have been a better decision to turn the airplane around and get it repaired.”

Yet, on this flight, they are encouraging them to continue.

Discussion

Some think the duty pilot was protecting the captain by trying to get him not to say he was fatigued while airborne. Protection from what? Others hear the duty pilot telling him to lie. Some think the captain would get in trouble by the FAA by using those words, but I can’t see it.

First, this is clearly no time for argument.

The decision this captain made, with solid rationale, was the safest course of action and could have ended there. But it was the dispatcher who used the words “fatigued” and led him down the wrong path telling him he had to speak to the duty pilot. This was an unnecessary discussion, and droning around the sky arguing over semantics was ridiculous. This captain never said he was fatigued. He said it would be fatiguing at this time of night to fly across country, after a long delay out of San Francisco due to the midnight hour, and his circadian clock without autothrust.

Regardless, no airline should challenge any pilot to discuss fatigue while flying. And for the duty pilot, yes… fatigue does happen in the sky. Been there, done that. And the FAA is never going to fault this crew for mitigating risk prior to the end of a flight.

Listen to the video and let me know what you think.

Alaska Mechanic Vinidcated

The legal battle is over for an Alaska Airlines mechanic and his inadvertent consumption of THC.

On October 7th 2023, I posted an article, Airline’s Random Drug Testing, regarding an Alaska Airlines Mechanic who tested positive for THC, the main psychoactive compound in marijuana. The consumption was inadvertent at a neighborhood block party. It was undisputed that he had THC in his system, and Alaska has a zero tolerance policy for drugs. This mechanic lives and works in Washington State, where THC is legal, but he testified that he only drinks beer and has never consumed drugs. But the Director who terminated the mechanic, never conducted an investigation to determine the validity of the mechanic's claims.

ALASKA

The mechanic’s union, AMFA, brought in attorney Lee Seham to fight this injustice, and the mechanic won the grievance! The arbitrator ruled reinstatement. Yet, Alaska did not like that ruling.

The RLA grievance process typically minimizes employee rights because there is no discovery, no attorney fees, and all too often the decision is purchased. The best the employee can get is his job back and wages if he is lucky enough to win.

This time the Airline did not play shenanigans with buying off an arbitrator, and the mechanic won. However, Alaska Airlines decided to fight the ruling and take this case to federal court to have it overturned. The injustice of that decision to fight the ruling frustrated many.

That’s when attorney Sam Seham joined his father in the federal battle. Sam is a mirror of his father in brilliance and legal acumen, and a year later, October 15, they made history in Federal Court!

The mechanic is reinstated, awarded back pay, and attorney fees!

You can read the entire ruling HERE But the conclusion is that the mechanic wins! He also wins attorney fees… that is amazing. This is a huge win for airline employees everywhere.

IV CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Union’s motion for summary judgment. The Court confirms the Board’s award and grants the Union’s request for attorney fees and costs. The Union may file a motion for attorney fees no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment. See LCR 54(d)(5) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 54(d)).

The Court REMANDS to the Board the issue of whether Chappell should be awarded back pay and benefits from the date of the arbitration award. The Court DENIES Alaska Airlines’ motion for summary judgment. Dated this 15th day of October, 2024. John H. Chun United States District Judge.

Criminal Intent and the ASAP System!

How is This Even Possible?

The ASAP program at SWA is compromised 

in more ways that one!!

Note to pilots everywhere: Don't believe what you write is confidential in the ASAP system. Pilots at SWA are in fact being disciplined. SWAPA's Casey Murray, President, and Tom Nekouei, Vice President, sent a memo to the pilot group discussing the many challenges and highlighted:

"In the case of the ASAP, SWAPA has had to put the Company on notice on multiple occasions due to their propensity to schedule disciplinary meetings despite ASAP and ERC [event review committee] recommendations." 

"Disciplinary Meetings at an All Time High"  

"The individuals responsible for creating our current safety and training problems cannot be the ones in charge of fixing them. And yet, kingdoms continued to be protected."  

Southwest Management is using the ASAP system to punish pilots, while at the same time they are hiding behind it to protect themselves! 

We all know pilots talk. And when those evaluating these cases are appalled by management's behavior nothing is sacred. Here we have a union upset that the company is using the system to punish the pilots, and yet management is running amok, withholding information from the captain, allowed a plane to operate illegally and then hid behind the ASAP system. 

Situation:

Executives on a plane together. The VP of Safety, SMS manager, Mr. David Hunt, realizes his seat is broken. Legally this plane cannot fly until it's either fixed or deferred and unoccupied. As the head of safety, he should know this... right? But he doesn't tell the captain, instead he tells another executive on the plane, Mr. Landon Nitschke, who happens to be the SVP of Maintenance. Nitschke doesn't tell the captain either. These executives don't want to delay their plans.

What these executives do next is call the arrival station to have it fixed there. No write up in the logbook before departure. No deferral. No advising the flight crew. Just knowingly and willingly operate a broken plane. And these men are in charge of Safety and Maintenance at SWA!!! They both know the federal regulations and intentionally allowed this plane to operate illegally. 

§ 121.363 states the certificate holder holds the responsibility for airworthiness. This should not be taken lightly. 

Worse yet, the SWA ASAP manager, Jim Ison, closed the case! The fix was to tell these executives they can't violated federal regulations in the future. This is intentional and willful neglect of the law. 

Do you think this event belongs in the ASAP system to protect executives intentional violation of federal regulations? I don't believe so. ASAP was enacted for identification of human factors errors to improve  operational safety. This event is pure negligence. 

Personally I think both these executives should be looking for jobs outside a safety industry. The FAA should have pulled this report from the program and conducted an investigation. Why didn't they?

What do you think?

Should these guys receive a free pass because they are management, while the captain had to spend his day off writing an ASAP report to protect his license as the result of the willful negligence of two senior vice presidents?

Dr. Karlene Petitt

PhD. MBA. MHS.
A350, B777, A330, B747-400, B747-200, B767, B757, B737, B727

Training to Blame?

NTSB Investigating!

Are they looking in the right place? 

People want to know why the Delta A350 didn't stop? Did they not see the other plane? The couldn't see the wing from the flight deck. Maybe the first officer was taxiing. The first officer could not see the wing. It was the fault of the other plane for being in the way. All sorts of reasons. But I hope when the NTSB looks into this, they look into training. 

Delta's 7th ground incursion since January! 

Durning my return to the A330 there was a significant change in training from when I earned a type rating on the plane years earlier. Delta was now saving money by not using motion on the simulator training events for type ratings. FAA approved. During my Captain's check ride, the check airman said, "You taxi shitty!" 

To his defense I said, "He's only had one opportunity during training to taxi with motion before now and he's coming off the 737."  The check airman was deeply concerned and said he would look into it. I think they increased the motion simulator event, but I am not positive by how many. But this training problem is more than simulator. 

Back in the day we had to know our aircraft limitations and dimensions, even be able to draw the electrical system during our FAA oral. Today, Delta gives their pilots an LOD, Learning objective document, which is simply the answers to the electronic test. If you memorize well, you pass. But I suppose the memories were not that good, so Delta decided to make this electronic test an open book test. Delta pilots do not need to know the physical dimensions of their plane, they can look it up. I wonder how many even know  the width of the taxiway? 

In this case, the A350 was schedule to depart behind the RJ, and they were having problems. Then were cleared to taxi forward down E to V. But the RJ had not pulled up all the way to the hold short line. 

First, pilots should not accept a clearance that will make them hit another plane. This is not the fault of the RJ. Just as you are not allowed to hit the car in an intersection, because you have a green light. 

There were many times I sat in that A350 seat and told the captain to stop, because I wasn't sure on the clearance distance. One time we sent another pilot back to look out the window for a better angle. Other times we queried ATC. 

Was this crew distracted by the problem? Did they blindly follow a clearance? Did the first officer not understand his responsibility? Did this captain receive minimum training with motion during taxi? Did they both look up the answers for the wingspan of the A350 without learning them? 

I hope the NTSB investigation looks deep into, because 7 ground incursions in 6 months is far too many... don't you think? 

Dr. Karlene Petitt

PhD. MBA. MHS.
A350, B777, A330, B747-400, B747-200, B767, B757, B737, B727

Pilot Training

More Not Less

We know what happened to the Brazilian ATR aircraft that killed 61 people. The plane was in a flat spin. What we don't know is why it happened.  

Back in the 1979-80, when I was just learning to fly, the FAA had stopped requiring spin training. My instructor said that we only had to learn how to recover from a stall. I asked him if we could still do it? He was pleased to comply. 

I  cut the power as I pulled the nose up and the plane stalled. He then he jammed in the rudder and we spun. Did the crew of this ATR enter a stall and as one wing dropped a pilot reacted by jamming in a rudder? Did they put their aircraft into a spin? Was ice involved? Was the problem the T-tail? There are many variables and rarely, if ever, its just one thing that causes a plane to crash.

We will know that answer when the they analyze the data recently received.  

This is not the fist time an ATR plane crashed.  In October of 1994, American Eagle, Fight 4184, was subject to freezing rain during a holding pattern, ice built up on the wings, and during descent the plane rolled. The autopilot disengaged and the plane crashed into a filed in Indiana, killing all 68 people on board.

T-tail aircraft are a problem with ice. Was the plane heavily loaded aft? I wonder when the cost of life will out weigh the profits of operating this aircraft. 

I also wonder if it was possible for them to get out of this spin once they entered. Or would this plane be unrecoverable. I posed that question to a friend and he sent me an interesting video. Beechcraft is also a twin engine T-tail aircraft, and they did spin testing. Mine spin training was in a Cessna 172.

Pilots have you received Spin Training?

While airlines and the FAA think reduced training is okay because of automation, this ideology might just be breeding an industry of pilots who lack aerodynamical skills. I am not making that claim against these pilots, I'm just curious if this is an overall problem. As my doctoral research identified, the more pilots train their performance decreases, of which is basis for Normalization of Deviance, a Threat to Aviation Safety. 

Twin Spin Testing Beechcraft Twin Video

Dr. Karlene Petitt

PhD. MBA. MHS.
A350, B777, A330, B747-400, B747-200, B767, B757, B737, B727