While we wait for the aircraft and black box to be pulled from the bottom of the Java Sea, there is a ton of speculation as to what happened.
"Many parallels between Air Asia 8501 and Air France 447 in June, 2009 are obvious. Both aircraft were lost in thunderstorm areas of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). Both crashed at sea where floating debris drifted for days from the point of contact with the sea before being discovered, and both were sophisticated fly-by-wire Airbus aircraft (though different models).
While flying into a thunderstorm is always to be avoided, it not likely the sole cause of the accident. The reported requests by the crew to deviate course and change altitude seeking to avoided thunderstorm cells and turbulence are completely normal..."
Captain Palmer is correct... it is never one thing. However, had the pilots not flown into that storm, that plane would still be flying today. Do we blame a bridge for the death of a person who jumps? Or do we blame the height, the depth of water, the roughness of the current or the inability to swim?
Unlike AF447, whose pilots flew at night with an improper radar setting and were caught by surprise, Air Asia 8501 pilots flew in daylight, knew the storm was there, attempted to go around and then over the storm at an altitude 1000 feet below the aircraft service ceiling.
An airline I once instructed at, demonstrates to their pilots during training the performance of a heavy A320 at maximum altitude (39,000 feet). In stable conditions, the stall and flying speed were divided by a narrow margin of 10 to 15 knots. A turn, or any turbulence, could cause the aircraft to stall. Imagine the plane balancing on the tip of a needle. Add turbulence of a storm that grew to 50,000 feet, with updrafts and cross winds, freezing conditions, moisture, etc., you have just flown into the perfect storm without a way out. Conditions that cannot be duplicated in a simulator.
The question should not be what brought down that plane, but how do we keep pilots from flying into such storms.
When I stated that we needed weather training, this had nothing to do with added simulator training. I was talking about weather theory, so pilots would understand the power of these storms and how to avoid them. Pilots must educate themselves on how to read weather charts, and understand weather systems associated with geographical areas they fly.
Did you know:
"The weather in the ITCZ has some unique qualities compared to your
average thunderstorm over land. The storms are driven by the convergence
of airflow patterns between the northern and southern hemispheres of
the Earth in addition to the usual factors of warm moist air and
unstable atmospheric conditions.
The height of the
stratosphere –- which tends to put a cap on the height of thunderstorm
growth averages about 35,000 feet over the mid latitudes (such as that
of mainland USA), but reaches to 50,000 feet or more in the ITCZ,
providing for the growth of thunderstorms to great heights and
accompanying intensity. These features can lead to some unusual
conditions such as icing or heavy rain within those storms where it may
not normally be expected, as was the case with AF 447 when its
airspeed-sensing probes became clogged." Captain Palmer
Shouldn't all pilots be appraised of the power of storms in the ITCZ?
Why Didn't They Turn Back?
Pilots are mission driven get the job done type of people. What that means is they will never throw their hands up in defeat, but always do everything they can to fly their plane. However, this also presents a challenge for many to turn back. The pilot push. Pilots want to complete the mission. Many times it's not even a conscious thought.
Experience also plays factor. We want the most experienced pilots flying our planes, but with that experience comes the human factor aspect of... I've been there and done that before, I can do it again. Most times they can, until they can't. Bottom line... this time they got caught.
The reason more of these types of accidents do not occur is because of captains who have the courage to say, "I don't feel like being a hero today." I experienced two situations in one month last fall, where both captains were heroes in my book. Each captain was highly experienced, and were the seen it all kind of pilots, but they also were able to project the "What If" into the future.
This projection is the essence of Level 3 Situational Awareness (SA), and will keep pilots and passengers safe. This level of SA is what we strive for in all aspects of aviation safety. More accidents would occur if we did not have pilots who could foresee what might happen, and were flexible to the mission.
If we ever get to no pilots in the flightdeck with remote controlled airplanes at the airlines (don't laugh, the industry is working that direction) we will see more of these types of accidents. Airplanes and technology are more apt to get caught in surprise conditions if a pilot is not on board saying, "Something doesn't feel right." We can program an airplane to navigate, but we cannot program a plane to feel. It's when we don't pay attention to the feelings of something isn't right is when we get into trouble. People make errors because they are human.
How do we make sure that pilots avoid a storm they can see building right in front of them? Education about the power of these storms. Education on how to read weather, how to avoid flying into storms, and instill the courage to turn back if what you see does not feel right.
These two books are excellent.
Every pilot should read them:
Truth in Fiction
In
Flight For Safety, I had written a scene that mirrors Air Asia 8501. (Asiana 214 was in there too, prior to the actual event).
Darby is flying south to Singapore with a senior pilot in an Airbus, A330. Red is blooming on the radar screen, but the captain (a check airman) attempts to beat the storm flying downwind of a cell, despite Darby's objection. The A330 loses all instruments, just as AF447. Stall. Stall. Stall. The same destination, a similar storm system, and an Airbus. But unlike Air Asia 8501, and AF447, the pilots and passengers survived because I was in control of the outcome.
If I can see this potential and write about an event a year prior to its occurrence, then this event should never have happened.
While a novel, lessons on how to fly an Airbus when encountering a loss of flight instruments should not be missed in Flight For Safety. There are also lessons in CRM on how assertive first officers should be in situations like this. Darby failed, but you don't have to.
We do not know why 8501 fell to it's death. But we do know what caused the initial blow. I have to ask, is there any reason to continue in the face of a storm? Is any life worth getting there itis? And if you do not know how powerful mother nature can be, educate yourself. Your life may depend upon it.
Enjoy the Journey and fly safe!
XO Karlene
