"We are the protagonists of our stories called life, and there is no limit to how high we can fly."
PHD. MBA. MHS. Type rated on A350, A330, B777, B747-400, B747-200, B757, B767, B737, B727. International Airline Pilot / Author / Speaker. Dedicated to giving the gift of wings to anyone following their dreams. Supporting Aviation Safety through training, writing, and inspiration. Fighting for Aviation Safety and Airline Employee Advocacy. Safety Culture and SMS change agent.
“Any landing you walk away from is a good landing”
might be wrong.
I’m surprised that anyone survived this crash, but I am not surprised that this event happened. This was not an “if” but a “when.” This was a training issue that resulted in pilot error. Fast, no flare, they slammed into the runway. But if we don't properly train pilots to land in strong winds, or how to identify when to go around, or how to do so, because that might cut into executives profit, then we failed these pilots.
Why has Nobody Interviewed the CEO
Captain James Graham?
Endeavor Air CEO James Graham
Substandard Training
In 2008 Delta and Northwest merged. In 2009 they formed a single operating certificate. In 2010, I experienced my first Delta training checkride, where the instructor did not give the federally required oral. He sat in the back of the simulator and texted instead of paying attention to the “new to” A330 pilots. He did not even give a debrief. He falsified training records. Why? Because as he said, “At Delta we have the power to do what we want.” He soon became a line check airman.
Meanwhile, in another Delta simulator a different instructor is telling Delta pilots, “Stop asking questions, be the monkey, hit the lever, get the banana.” Delta even provides answers to the written tests, computerized now, for rote memorization. To pass the test however, sometimes you have to answer incorrectly, because the test is wrong. Their training manuals for years said the Airbus A330 had a stick shaker. It does not.
Pilots who flow up to mainline Delta and cannot pass this training are allowed to return to their same captain position, at Endeavor. While I can only attest to facts of Delta’s substandard training to first-hand experience and trial testimony, I only have hearsay as to how bad Endeavor’s training is. The FAA will have to investigate that. But there is the problem.
Effort to Improve Safety
In 2014 I returned to school to earn a doctoral degree in aviation focused on Safety to figure out what the hell was going on at Delta. I learned of SMS and realized that Delta’s processes were violating Federal Regulations, and that substandard training led to the lack of understanding that resulted in accidents. During my defense, a professor said, “What do you think they will do now?” as a result of my findings. “They” being management and the FAA. But the FAA already knew, and management refused to invest in training and the FAA looked the other way.
In 2015 I heard Delta’s CEO, Richard Anderson at the time, speak on safety and reporting that conflicted with the Delta culture. Therefore, I requested a meeting with senior executives, Captain Steve Dickson and Captain James Graham to discuss my concerns. In 2015, Graham put in writing that he planned to send me into a psychiatric evaluation after our meeting went through. In 2016, four months later, Graham and Dickson met with me. Two months after that, they enacted the hit to have me removed, in the exact manner Graham had said that he would.
Safety Concerns
During trial, March 20, 2019, Captain James Graham, Delta’s SVP of flight operations at the time, not only perjured himself on multiple accounts during trial, but he proudly testified, “And Flight Operations, specifically, our ASAP program now has, for the year 2018, we were just over 25,000 reports that were brought forward from our pilot group!” That is not a metric to be proud of.
In my report to captains Dickson and Graham, I expressed my deep concern that pilots could not fly based upon what Captain Dempsey, Delta’s Chair, Human Factors Working Group, told me. He had departed an airport heading to Atlanta, but he lost his auto flight system on takeoff. Dempsey continued to fly to Atlanta, but requested a block altitude, meaning the pilot is unable to fly a specific altitude so they need more airspace. He also flew into RVSM airspace, an altitude that requires an autopilot due to close separation of 1000 feet from other traffic. Upon arrival, Dempsey declared an emergency because ATC refused to provide a block altitude for their arrival phase. He used the emergency card for something that was not an emergency. The Training Department used this as an example of “workload management” and created a training video telling pilots to declare an emergency if they, too, lose their auto flight system.
The problems with this video were many. The FAA and office of inspector general were working to convince pilots to hand fly due to an endemic loss of hand-flying skills. However, this training video stated that hand-flying was an emergency procedure. The worst part of all this was I reached out to Dempsey about this event, and he told me that, “Delta as a group, cannot fly Level 0, nor can we fly Level 4, so says ASAP.” Level 0 is when there’s no automation engaged, complete manual flight, and that would be no flight director, auto thrust, autopilot. Level 4 is a fully automated aircraft. Delta did not train their pilots but suggested they declare an emergency if they lost their autopilot.
Dempsey emailed me that a Delta Boeing 737 on final in ATL in IMC, meaning they were in the clouds, and at 700 feet the pilots decide to go around but hit the auto throttle button instead of go-around button and the flight director stayed in approach mode. Neither pilot noticed that the pitch was 3 degrees and power was at 56% N1 power, those were not the pitch and power settings for a go around. They should have been approximately 12 degrees up and 90% power. Dempsey said that they didn’t even have the situational awareness to look beyond the flight director and recognize something was wrong. They got to 186 feet, with over 2,000 feet per minute descent, before going around, as the warning systems wailed in the background. Passengers on that flight came within seconds of dying.
Did these pilots attempt a go-around and push the wrong button? That might explain why they did not flare. I am not saying this is what happened, but the thought occurred to me rewriting this event. The NTSB will hopefully answer that question.
The Safety Presentation
Captain James Graham invited me to give a safety presentation as part of his ploy to have me removed, despite already having removed me for mental health concerns because I reported safety. I explained to Captain John Tovani, the director of training, at that presentation, that 90% of my concerns were training related. Yet Delta did nothing but pay a doctor $74,000 to diagnose me as bipolar. The short version of how this ended can be read in the Seattle Times article.
While Dickson was the FAA administrator, awaiting Delta’s appeal, the file regarding Delta’s violation of order for violating duty times regulations disappeared. I have the FOIA response that it existed, but the FAA sanitized Delta’s culpability. Dickson resigned within days of Delta losing their appeal.
Captain James Graham Credibility Assessment by ALJ Judge Morris:
“The Tribunal further questions the candor of Captain Graham’s testimony at various points and occasionally found his testimony to be incredible. In particular, the Tribunal gives little credit to his statements that Complainant’s safety report had no bearing on his decision to refer Complainant for a Section 15 evaluation.” (Decision and Order pg. 71).
“Tribunal accepts as proven—the many inconsistencies in his testimony between his deposition and his hearing testimony. Compl. Br. at 40-42. The sequence of events left the Tribunal with the impression that Captain Graham harbored little if any tolerance for criticism of the organization he ran, especially criticism from a line pilot like Complainant.” (Decision and Order pg. 71).
“The two key actors involved here are Captain Graham and Mr. Puckett. They were the parties moving the pieces in the chess game in which Complainant found herself an unwitting player.” (Decision and Order pg. 99)
Endeavor Air CEO, Captain James Graham
Endeavor Air CEO James Graham
Please answer the question.
How is it possible that Captain James Graham could possibly become Endeavor Air’s, Delta’s wholly owned subsidiary, CEO?
Pilot training under his leadership at Delta was substandard, and when a pilot tried to speak out, with an internal safety report, he violated federal regulations and retaliated. I never lost my first class medial, despite a bipolar diagnosis, but Dr. Altman forfeiting his medical license. Beating Delta in trial and appeal, Dickson retired early from the FAA. Yet how is Captain Graham allowed to be the CEO of Endeavor Air as a result of his actions?
No, I am not surprised that this Delta plane crashed in Toronto. I’m simply surprised that an accident has not happened sooner. The FAA is allowing Delta and Endeavor to do whatever they want to save money; training be damned. These pilots, while their error caused the crash, are every bit a victim to FAA approved substandard training. The CEO, Captain James Graham, and FAA are fully responsible.
In that nobody was held accountable at Delta for their retaliatory actions, despite their loss in federal court, including Graham, Dickson and the Delta CEO, Ed Bastian, I wrote a book to help encourage employees to safely report, and how to use the law to protect themselves, Delta's Debacle, Legal Lessons Learned and Shared to Save your Career and Improve Safety. Safety is contingent upon employees reporting safety concerns.
I'm uncertain what else I can do, but enough is enough. If substandard training worldwide is not improved, then we will see more of these accidents. This time we got lucky, but safety should not be based upon luck.
Do not blame the pilots for accepting runway 33, as pilots daily accommodate runway change requests safely. Do not blame the helicopter pilots because they were doing training and human error is inevitable. Do not even blame the lights of the city, the night, night goggles, or a controller for managing two runways. These are all known and ongoing facts of daily operations. Blame the FAA! Why? That agency had the responsibility and authority to mitigate the risk in this environment, and despite multiple warnings they did nothing.
Below is a copy of the ICAO risk mitigation chart. Everyone can see that these operations into DCA would be in the red zone mandating a fix. They've always been in the red zone because we should never have had military operations conducting training and flying below passenger aircraft.
The FAA did not mitigate risk in this high risk environment, despite every message saying they should, and thus this accident happened. The question was never "if" it would happen, it was always "when" it would happen. The FAA rolled the dice on the profitability of airline operations over passenger safety. The passengers, crew, and all their families lost.
Our safety system is supposed to identify and reduce risk so accidents don't happen. In the past, we had a system that fixed the problem after we killed people, so it wouldn't occur again. Today we have systems in place to mitigate risk, to avoid the crash before we kill people, but the FAA does not enforce any of them.
History taught us that poor crew communications impacted safety, thus in 1990 CRM began. AQP became a methodology for training with a CRM focus. The 5th generation of CRM brought us Threat and Error Management. These regulations and programs identified our industry was working towards a positive safety culture. Without a positive safety culture, we do not have a safe environment. Then in 2015 came Safety Management Systems (SMS). But wait! Did you know that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) introduced SMS to its annexes in 1980? It took the FAA 35 years to enact SMS in the United States. This federal regulation was not enacted until 2015, but airlines were not required to have one in place until 2018.
SMS is a federal regulation that mandates risk mitigation. Everyone in the organization is tasked to identify and report high-risk operations to those empowered to create change and reduce risk and avoid accidents. Unfortunately employees are retaliated against when they report safety concerns and their lives are subsequently destroyed. Even when the FAA knows of the violations, the employees still face adverse actions. While it's not the FAA's responsibility to defend pilots, it is their responsibility to protect the airspace! The FAA received ASAP reports and knew of the multiple near misses and yet they did nothing.
We know that that the Blackhawk helicopter hit the American Eagle Jet. We know that this was a checking event. We even know they were off altitude and course. The answers as to why the course and altitude irregularities, will (should) be disclosed after the accident investigation. I speculate that human error was involved. Human error is inevitable, and the reason we have implemented safety measures over the years, to help trap and capture those errors. While it appears the industry has been working to improve safety, unfortunately todays safety measures are nothing but smoke and mirrors.
CBS NEWS
Why is the FAA to Blame?
Because the FAA has an incestuous relationship with airline management. Many of those in FAA oversight also do not have a clue as to the new regulations or constraints of flying today. One FAA oversight inspector on Delta's certificate said, when I mentioned SMS and AQP, "I don't know what those are because I retired before they came into effect." That is scary. Regardless, the options as how to mitigate risk in this DCA environment were many, but they would have impacted the bottom line of airline operations. Therefore, status quo until death.
Until we prohibit the revolving door between airline management, the FAA, and the board of directors position, and find an FAA administrator who believes in life over money and doing the right thing, we will continue to play Russian Roulette with passengers lives.
Heartfelt Prayers to all
living with loss as a result of this crash.
My heartfelt prayers go out to the families of those lost in this accident. I will not allow your loved ones deaths to be in vain. I'm actually angry at what transpired because it could have been avoided if the FAA did its job. This is the very reason I spoke out in 2015, to fight for safety so accidents would not happen and I fought a legal battle for seven years to create change. (Petitt vs Delta, Seattle Times) Nobody was held accountable. No change was made. And the FAA looked the other way and even sanitized records of violations. There are a lot of good people working in the FAA, but they too are fearful for their jobs if they speak out. Something must be done. I took early retirement in 2023 so I could be a voice for safety, and I while we cannot bring your loved ones back, I will fight to make change happen.
I hope that every person will file a wrongful death lawsuit against the FAA. I have evidence of what I write here today and will provide as requested. We cannot bring your loved ones back, but we can create change together and ensure the pain you feel will never be experienced by anyone else.
On December 31, 2024 I wrote the post, a Sad End to 2024, and I speculated what I thought happened with the December 29, Jeju crash, based upon the facts we knew. They were fast, they did not extend flaps, no gear, and no communication beyond a Mayday, and go around, and we know they were not incapacitated because they turned and landed on the centerline of a runway in the opposite direction, but sadly they hit a wall. But that wall in any other city could have saved lives, and these pilots had the ability to avoid it. Why didn't they?
Some people went on attack because they did not want me to speculate and said we had to wait for the black box. I even received a death threat. But I spoke out early for a reason, so we would not have a repeat event like we did with the second Max crash. I hoped through intelligent discussions we could impart wisdom on pilots without experience and inadequate training. I also believed this event was due to lack of training, and the reason for the pilots reaction, and perhaps controlling agencies would look into that.
I also speculated that we may
never hear what is on that black box.
I was correct about the black box. As it turns out, the right engine was also still producing power, therefore there is no reason that it "stopped working". Do we now speculate what happened to the black box? Do we speculate why Jeju "says " the black box stopped working 4 minutes before impact? Do you think there could be something on that recording they do not want the world to hear? Now do we speculate what happened on this flight or just throw up our hands and stick our heads in the sand, because speculation is apparently a dirty word to some, as is panic.
As I was looking for others who were expressing their opinions this morning, I found a great video that discussed the impact of fatigue, as this flight was a red-eye, and most definitely attributed to the outcome. The best question the pilot asks is why did they not just continue and land after the bird strike? That's what I trained my pilots to do back in the day.
Then why did the captain make a right turn for returning, when he was in the left seat? Mike Rocket Blackstone shares some great advice for pilots who might not anticipate what could happen when shit happens. He also notices that the right engine was in reverse, therefore operating and the gear could have been extended. Why wasn't it? The right engine that hit birds still had thrust. He believes that they may have shutdown the wrong engine, which is a common thought for those willing to discuss the accident. Then he asks why not aim away from the wall and veer off? Good thought.
These are all really good discussion topics, and things to think about. If you have not watched this video, I highly recommend it. The title states, "Many Pilot Errors..." therefore, those sensitive pilots who cannot imagine a pilot making an error, might feel disturbed when they realize the many pilot errors that likely caused this accident. My concern is why they made the errors, because that is what can be addressed.
Check out the video above as this is the most articulate analysis I have watched. And now, this is all we have to go on, because... we do not have a black box. Which, yes...it's actually orange. So now... what are you going to do... Speculate?
Today Flight To Success is on the Book of the Day Club at a special price for you! I am thankful to the Book of the Day Club, but I am celebrating all my readers this year by offering them a chance to win a really fun car, with special memories, love taps, and a story as to why I purchased this car twice.
For every book you purchase during 2025, you will be entered into a drawing to win my 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse. Last year she got a new clutch and transmission, so she is ready to go to a new home. After my husband's stroke, this is simply not an appropriate second car for us, and she needs to be driven. So, it's time she finds someone else to love and take care of her. What a better way than to give this to someone I am so appreciative of.
RULES:
Buy a paper version of ANY Book on my site, and you get two entries per your autographed book. If you purchase off this blog, or my website bookstore I will be notified. The bookstore is new, and not sure on the functionality, so thanks for working with me if there are technical issues, and we will sort it out. If you are charged too much shipping for multiple orders off the website, I will fix that for you.
Buy audible (only flight for control so far) and email me at Karlene.Petitt@gmail.com and show proof of purchase, and you get an entry.
Buy any ebook and email me at Karlene.Petitt@gmail.com and show proof of purchase, and you get an entry.
Buy any book off Amazon and show proof of purchase and get an entry.
Leave a comment on Amazon, and send me a copy of the posting and get another entry!
Send a picture of you reading one of the paper books and get an entry!
It's Simple!
Many ways to Enter the Drawing!
and
This Contest is Worldwide!
PURCHASERS OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY:
Paper books are not cost effective to buy due to shipping, and the car cannot be shipped either. But it could be driven to Canada or Mexico. Regardless, if you buy ebooks, or purchase paper off your local Amazon, and you win, I will help you sell the car for the best value and Venmo you the dollar amount. Even US winners have this option.
Car DELIVERY
To
SeaTac Airport
Or any other airports nearby Seattle
I will coordinate with you to meet you at SeaTac Airport and help you to register the car in your name, but then she is yours.
From a pilot's perspective there is not a damn thing we can do if our plane is shot out of the sky. However, when there is a bird strike, that's a different story. This is when our training takes over. While a bird strike could be catastrophic at the wrong time, pilots should have the emotional stability and requisite training to fly the plane. In my opinion, these pilots panicked.
I have not seen footage of their first arrival. Were they configured for landing? I would assume so, therefore, on their miss-approach they brought up their gear and flaps for the go-around. Meaning they had hydraulics to do so. A flock of birds could have impacted their hydraulics, yes. But if so, that did not force them to fly at full speed without flaps and belly the aircraft into a landing, ultimately hitting a wall at full speed.
On a missed approach, if they lost an engine and needed the performance, they would have brought the gear up and some flaps. They did not have to bring up all the flaps and put the plane into a clean configuration. Furthermore, if hydraulics were a concern the prudent thing would have been to leave some of the flaps out in anticipation of alternate flap extension.
What should have happened if the plane was impacted by birds, a calm declaration to the tower such as, "Tower, Jeju 7C2216 had a bird strike. We lost our engine. We have a hydraulic issue. We would like to hold close to the runway to run our checklists."
The Boeing 737 has engine driven hydraulic pumps, but also electric hydraulic pumps. The Boeing 737 even has an alternate gear extension system. Any pilot in this situation should hold, meaning they fly circles in the sky, and see what systems they have available, run checklists, and determine if there is enough runway length to land at their given weight. At the very least make their plane as light as possible before they attempted to land on a marginally sufficient runway, if that was their only option. These pilots took none of these actions
The pilots repeatedly called "May Day" and landed, with multiple warnings screaming in their flight deck because of the the lack of flaps and gear at a low altitude. They ignored the warnings and pressed on, without knowledge or understanding that their actions would result in death. Clean, short runway, they were fast.
A fight or flight response is not often mentioned with piloting, but this is a perfect example that pilots need to keep flying the plane. To fight, would mean to do what is necessary to attack the problem. The flight response is to run. In this case these pilots felt running toward the safety of the ground was their best option. Were they aware of the redundant aircraft systems? Did they train for bird strikes? Did they lack understanding and therefore lacked confidence? Did they understand the inability to stop on the runway? Did they realize what they were about to do, would result in death? I suspect not. And becasue of that lack of understanding 179 people died.
I believe with the new generation of pilots worldwide, without experience, and substandard training, that we might see similar situations in the future. Many think this is a foreign issue, not to be found in the US, but they would be wrong. As our highly experienced pilots are forced to retire at the age of 65, and are replaced with the new generation of pilots without experience, plugged into a training foot print to push them out as quickly as possible, I fear we will be seeing more accidents.
There have been far too many accidents and incidents in 2024. By the grace of God have not manifested into such a catastrophe as this. Our industry is not getting safer, but going the wrong direction. Two solutions that could help mitigate the risk are as follows:
Retain experienced pilots. Extend the pilot retirement age to 67.
Improve pilot training to ensure the highest level of understanding and ability.
What do you think the solutions should be?
DO NOT RUSH!
Happy New Year
And health and Happiness to you and your family!
There are families who will not have a happy new year as a result of this needless crash. What will it take for airlines and regulatory agencies alike to do the right thing and prevent such loss? I'm not sure. I've seen the worst of training and violations with no accountability, so I wonder what will it take?
May all your flights be safe in 2025
PS: I do not blame the pilots. They are a product of their environment. The company is responsible for putting them in the air ill prepared.
Details Alleged In the Naked and Masturbating SWA Captain Haak Case
Public filings recently emerged in the Christine Janning v. SWA and SWAPA case alleging Southwest System Chief Pilot, David Newton, attempted to obstruct the FBI’s Federal investigation. Apparently, in the hours just after learning that Janning had reported Captain Haak’s crimes to the FBI, David Newton wrote an email to multiple employees revealing Janning’s participation in the FBI investigation, sharing both her name and home address.
As if revealing the identity of a federally protected victim/witness in an ongoing federal investigation wasn’t bad enough, Newton advised that Janning’s removal was pursuant to a section of the contract (CBA 2.C.) which is ONLY reserved for pilots that have committed a crime, been detained by authorities for suspected illicit behavior, or if the pilot has demonstrated tendencies that draw into question their mental fitness for duty. None of which applied to Janning.
In short, a section 2.C. Is a “death sentence.” And according to Janning's recent filing, Newton's 2.C.citation “was done with purpose and malice for the express purpose of advising the recipients, that Ms. Janning was removed for the commission of a crime, and/or for psychological and fitness for duty.” (¶112)
The Significance of “2.C”
Airlines have sections in their contracts, or policies, identifying actions for pilot violations, criminal behavior, or mental fitness for duty. At Southwest they call it a 2.C. at Delta they have a Section 15, the very language Delta used to weaponize my psychological evaluation in effort to destroy my career and professional reputation. This language is a death sentence and Airlines use it to weaponize the psychological evaluation process to silence pilots like Christine, myself and others.
The FBI Was Not Amused
Christine was a federally protected victim/witness, and neither the FBI or the DOJ found Newton’s tactics of revealing their investigation to internal employees or sharing Janning by name with home address amusing, and thus turned their investigations into the retaliatory actions by Janning’s managers, specifically David Newton:
¶ 129 - “[Janning] advised FBI investigators of the significance of 2.C.language, and that her removal from all flying duties was actually a veiled threat to force Ms. Janning into a retaliatory psychological evaluation for reporting her incident to federal authorities.”
¶ 131 - “The DOJ immediately intervened and prohibited their federally protected witness from being threatened further.”
¶ 132 - “As a result of SWA’s retaliatory actions against Ms. Janning, primarily those of Cpt. Newton, the DOJ Prosecutor warned SWA, that Cpt. Newton’s, December 9, 2020 correspondence [2.C. email] jeopardized, their Federal case, and the victim’s privacy, by revealing their primary witness by name and home address, and exposed her to scrutiny by revealing her participation in a federal investigation.”
¶133 - The DOJ instructed Southwest to retain outside counsel because Newton’s email displayed a reckless disregard of the truth, and he exercise no ordinary care in the distribution of the misinformation, but he also violated Federal laws and DOJ and FBI policy when he disseminated his emails to a multitude of SWA and SWAPA employees of their investigation.”
¶ 134 - “The FBI and DOJ, warned Cpt. Newton, and SWA Legal, of possible, ‘prison time’ for their disclosure and interference and insinuated that charges may be a possibility.”
Janning has revealed these new details of retaliation and defamation in her amended complaint, in a case that she filed over two-years ago, because a Ninth Judicial Circuit of Orange County Florida Civil Judge, Judge Eric Netcher, has threatened to release Southwest System Chief Pilot David Newton from her lawsuit, asserting that the 2.C. language isn’t defamatory and therefore Janning couldn’t be harmed. What?!
Rumors of a mental health issue and/or criminal behavior of a pilot is damning enough. Yet as we all know the talk on the flight line will grow exponentially with such false rumors. This fact, is one of the reasons that Judge Morris awarded such a significant amount in my case, ten times higher than typical, because of the "pilot talk." He knows the power of gossip and how damning what Delta asserted can be. We all do.
Southwest and SWAPA argue that 2.C. language is nothing more than an administrative formality and serves only as notification to Janning advising of her removal. Janning is making every effort to enlighten the Judge so he understands the reality of what false assertions can do to a pilot. Thus, he is giving her another bite at this, and the reason for this new filing.
I've been following this case, and after reading this current filing, and if Judge Netcher were to follow through with granting Southwest Motion to Dismiss David Newton, Janning has a strong argument for appeal. Prayers he allows justice to prevail.
You may recall in Janning’s lawsuit, Captain Haak, the perpetrator, plead guilty in 2021 to a lewd obscene act under DC Federal Code, that included exposing the anus and genitals and masturbating, all while he was piloting a Boeing 737 at 41,000 feet with passengers and crew on board, while in the presence of his female First Officer, Christine Janning.
Since being sexually assaulted in the air, Christine Janning has been on a mission to legally hold Southwest Airlines, their managers, and her pilot union Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Association, SWPA, accountable, for covering up Captain Michael Haak’s previous sexual proclivities and acts of sexual harassment multiple female and male victims. Despite her employer’s attempts to throw multiple motions to dismiss her case, Janning is not giving up her fight.
What do you think?
Time has a way of revealing all things, and the SWA and SWAPA delays have proven to be an asset. Christine has been contacted by multiple assault victims of Southwest perpetrators, not just Michael Haak, and she has helped them in their own battles.
If you are an employee of Southwest Airlines and a victim of sexual harassment or assault, I highly encourage you to reach out to Christine. She can help. You can reach her through stopairlineassault@proton.me.
Last week the world listened to the recording of the Delta Captain of Fight 564 who departed on a redeye flight, lost the autopilot, autothrust, and received a TAT probe message. They wanted to return, and the argument began as to the reason why he was returning, and what was legal to say or not.
Delta Flight 564 Return
The captain said he was departing Flight Level 1500, but that could have been due to the high stress, or maybe he didn’t know when flight levels began. Airlines do not typically train this type of information any more. This is one of those new hire captains with two years on the plane, I was told two years at the company, with less than 500 hours in type. Not the point, but he now has a broken airplane, and he’s making a good decision to return.
Dispatch has them reset the circuit breakers and they get their auto pilot back, but the TAT remains inoperative, therefore they have a variety of issues as a result thereof, one being the autothrust. The TAT is the Total Air Temperature Sensor, a heated probe that is an essential for input to the air data computer for static air temperature and true airspeed and they must avoid icing condition. The autothrust is gone.
As they fly circles, after dealing with the issue of resetting circuit breakers, the captain asks dispatch, “Is there something we’re waiting for?” And the dispatcher responds by telling them about the icing conditions on the route, but says there would not be any on arrival. They must avoid icing due to the probe failure. They will also have only have 10 minutes of holding over Albany, I suspect the alternate.
Then the captain tells dispatch, “We are right at our peak circadian low and I spoke with the first officer, and we don’t believe it’s within safety to continue flying throughout the night, at this time with no autothrottles.” He does not say he is fatigued. The circadian low statement was his asserting the time of night with his body clock. He never said, “We’re fatigued.”
Dispatch says, “Okay if you want to return because of fatigue, I can call the duty pilot to get him on the line.” The dispatcher apparently did not understand what the captain said, and was told that the duty pilot must give permission to call in fatigued. He wasn’t actually calling in fatigued.
PROBLEM BEGINS
They can’t get the duty pilot on the line, so they decide to land anyway. Then the duty pilot jumps on and the conversation degrades, opening preponderance of discussion amongst those who have listened to the audio.
You need to listen to this video yourself. But basically these are the questionable statements:
Duty pilot says, “Okay, this is new to me. You’re calling in fatigued airborne?”
“I’m confused with this fatigue versus a mechanical issue.”
The captain tries to explain.
Duty pilot says, “Okay umm… being that you’re airborne I would highly suggest that you not say that you’re fatigued for operation and more for mechanical situation I’m not sure how we can report you’re operating in a fatigued condition.”
He was not reporting in a fatigued condition. However, if he had been fatigued… why can’t a pilot report that in flight? I would hope that my pilots, if fatigued in flight, would want to land instead of falling asleep on final five hours later.
Additional Factors
Time of Day and Delay:
The crew was delayed out of San Francisco. This was a redeye flight. If you fly at night, your pilots will experience more fatigue than in the day. They are flying opposite to their body clock and there is no way they will be rested as if they had a good night sleep and awoke in the morning to fly. This flight had only have two pilots versus the four pilot international flights where pilots can sleep half the time.
Mechanical issue:
No auto thrust, no TAT and associated failed equipment, and a potential for the autopilot circuit breakers to blow again. Personally I would not take the flight.
History:
Delta had a 757-redeye flight out of Seattle, diverted for a medical. Then continued to Atlanta and both pilots fell asleep on arrival. The first officer awoke because the gear warning screamed as the plane flew toward the ground with gear up. They should have called fatigued on the divert.
A Delta Captain departed a daytime, three-hour, flight into Atlanta, in a 737, without an autopilot and autothrust. After three hours of flight, he then declared an emergency. Delta made a training video encouraging pilots to declare an emergency if they lose automation, because they have data that shows Delta pilots as a whole cannot fly without the automation. When questioned about this event retired FAA administrator, Steve Dickson the SVP of flight operations at the time, asserted, “It gives the impression that we are going to place operational requirements above safety requirements. It probably would have been a better decision to turn the airplane around and get it repaired.”
Yet, on this flight, they are encouraging them to continue.
Discussion
Some think the duty pilot was protecting the captain by trying to get him not to say he was fatigued while airborne. Protection from what? Others hear the duty pilot telling him to lie. Some think the captain would get in trouble by the FAA by using those words, but I can’t see it.
First, this is clearly no time for argument.
The decision this captain made, with solid rationale, was the safest course of action and could have ended there. But it was the dispatcher who used the words “fatigued” and led him down the wrong path telling him he had to speak to the duty pilot. This was an unnecessary discussion, and droning around the sky arguing over semantics was ridiculous. This captain never said he was fatigued. He said it would be fatiguing at this time of night to fly across country, after a long delay out of San Francisco due to the midnight hour, and his circadian clock without autothrust.
Regardless, no airline should challenge any pilot to discuss fatigue while flying. And for the duty pilot, yes… fatigue does happen in the sky. Been there, done that. And the FAA is never going to fault this crew for mitigating risk prior to the end of a flight.
Listen to the video and let me know what you think.
