Criminal Intent and the ASAP System!

How is This Even Possible?

The ASAP program at SWA is compromised 

in more ways that one!!

Note to pilots everywhere: Don't believe what you write is confidential in the ASAP system. Pilots at SWA are in fact being disciplined. SWAPA's Casey Murray, President, and Tom Nekouei, Vice President, sent a memo to the pilot group discussing the many challenges and highlighted:

"In the case of the ASAP, SWAPA has had to put the Company on notice on multiple occasions due to their propensity to schedule disciplinary meetings despite ASAP and ERC [event review committee] recommendations." 

"Disciplinary Meetings at an All Time High"  

"The individuals responsible for creating our current safety and training problems cannot be the ones in charge of fixing them. And yet, kingdoms continued to be protected."  

Southwest Management is using the ASAP system to punish pilots, while at the same time they are hiding behind it to protect themselves! 

We all know pilots talk. And when those evaluating these cases are appalled by management's behavior nothing is sacred. Here we have a union upset that the company is using the system to punish the pilots, and yet management is running amok, withholding information from the captain, allowed a plane to operate illegally and then hid behind the ASAP system. 

Situation:

Executives on a plane together. The VP of Safety, SMS manager, Mr. David Hunt, realizes his seat is broken. Legally this plane cannot fly until it's either fixed or deferred and unoccupied. As the head of safety, he should know this... right? But he doesn't tell the captain, instead he tells another executive on the plane, Mr. Landon Nitschke, who happens to be the SVP of Maintenance. Nitschke doesn't tell the captain either. These executives don't want to delay their plans.

What these executives do next is call the arrival station to have it fixed there. No write up in the logbook before departure. No deferral. No advising the flight crew. Just knowingly and willingly operate a broken plane. And these men are in charge of Safety and Maintenance at SWA!!! They both know the federal regulations and intentionally allowed this plane to operate illegally. 

§ 121.363 states the certificate holder holds the responsibility for airworthiness. This should not be taken lightly. 

Worse yet, the SWA ASAP manager, Jim Ison, closed the case! The fix was to tell these executives they can't violated federal regulations in the future. This is intentional and willful neglect of the law. 

Do you think this event belongs in the ASAP system to protect executives intentional violation of federal regulations? I don't believe so. ASAP was enacted for identification of human factors errors to improve  operational safety. This event is pure negligence. 

Personally I think both these executives should be looking for jobs outside a safety industry. The FAA should have pulled this report from the program and conducted an investigation. Why didn't they?

What do you think?

Should these guys receive a free pass because they are management, while the captain had to spend his day off writing an ASAP report to protect his license as the result of the willful negligence of two senior vice presidents?

Dr. Karlene Petitt

PhD. MBA. MHS.
A350, B777, A330, B747-400, B747-200, B767, B757, B737, B727

Training to Blame?

NTSB Investigating!

Are they looking in the right place? 

People want to know why the Delta A350 didn't stop? Did they not see the other plane? The couldn't see the wing from the flight deck. Maybe the first officer was taxiing. The first officer could not see the wing. It was the fault of the other plane for being in the way. All sorts of reasons. But I hope when the NTSB looks into this, they look into training. 

Delta's 7th ground incursion since January! 

Durning my return to the A330 there was a significant change in training from when I earned a type rating on the plane years earlier. Delta was now saving money by not using motion on the simulator training events for type ratings. FAA approved. During my Captain's check ride, the check airman said, "You taxi shitty!" 

To his defense I said, "He's only had one opportunity during training to taxi with motion before now and he's coming off the 737."  The check airman was deeply concerned and said he would look into it. I think they increased the motion simulator event, but I am not positive by how many. But this training problem is more than simulator. 

Back in the day we had to know our aircraft limitations and dimensions, even be able to draw the electrical system during our FAA oral. Today, Delta gives their pilots an LOD, Learning objective document, which is simply the answers to the electronic test. If you memorize well, you pass. But I suppose the memories were not that good, so Delta decided to make this electronic test an open book test. Delta pilots do not need to know the physical dimensions of their plane, they can look it up. I wonder how many even know  the width of the taxiway? 

In this case, the A350 was schedule to depart behind the RJ, and they were having problems. Then were cleared to taxi forward down E to V. But the RJ had not pulled up all the way to the hold short line. 

First, pilots should not accept a clearance that will make them hit another plane. This is not the fault of the RJ. Just as you are not allowed to hit the car in an intersection, because you have a green light. 

There were many times I sat in that A350 seat and told the captain to stop, because I wasn't sure on the clearance distance. One time we sent another pilot back to look out the window for a better angle. Other times we queried ATC. 

Was this crew distracted by the problem? Did they blindly follow a clearance? Did the first officer not understand his responsibility? Did this captain receive minimum training with motion during taxi? Did they both look up the answers for the wingspan of the A350 without learning them? 

I hope the NTSB investigation looks deep into, because 7 ground incursions in 6 months is far too many... don't you think? 

Dr. Karlene Petitt

PhD. MBA. MHS.
A350, B777, A330, B747-400, B747-200, B767, B757, B737, B727